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Abstract
We present a three-component model of a digi-
tal investigation which comprises: determination of
input-output layers, assignment of read and write
operations associated with use of forensic tools, and
time-stamping of read and write operations. This
builds on work of several authors, culminating in
the new model presented here which is generic, scal-
able and compatible with all functions in the sys-
tem, and which is guaranteed to produce a high
quality of reproducibility.
1 Introduction
With the development of modern computers and
networks, computer-related crime has become a
threat to society because of the immense damage
it can inflict while at the same time it has reached
a level of sophistication which makes it difficult to
track it to its source. However, any computer crime
leaves a trail of evidence in the form of digital infor-
mation stored or transmitted on electronic compo-
nents. In order to be usable as evidence in a court
of law, such information needs to be captured in
a systematic way without altering it in so doing.
Thus, the process of identification and handling of
the evidence is of prime concern in a forensic inves-
tigation.
In 2001, several organizations came together in
the Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS)
to establish a generic approach to the investiga-
tive process as applied to digital systems and net-
works. One of the outcomes was a proposal for
a digital investigative process that comprises “the
use of scientifically derived and proven methods to-
ward the preservation, collection, validation, iden-
tification, analysis, interpretation, documentation
and presentation of digital evidence derived from
digital sources for the purpose of facilitating or
furthering the reconstruction of events found to
be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorized
actions shown to be disruptive to planned opera-
tions.” [Palmer, 2001]
In determining the effectiveness of a scientific
method approach, one of the key factors is ‘repro-
ducibility’, that is, the ability to achieve a consis-
tent level of quality throughout the investigative
process, no matter how many times it is repeated
under the same conditions. With respect to re-
producibility, the forensic tools applied in the pro-
cedure must be of reliable, and measurable, qual-
ity, and the investigative process itself must be well
formulated and logically laid out to achieve a best
outcome.
In the present paper we pull together old and new
ideas in establishing a model of input-output which
is suitable for digital investigations where proof of
reproducibility of the results is required. In devel-
oping this model, we draw on work of Gerber and
Leeson [Gerber and Leeson, 2004] on the Hadley
model of input-output layers evolved from the stan-
dardized Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) lay-
ers, on the work of Carrier [Carrier, 2003], who ar-
gues for the freedom to choose input-output layers
appropriate to the requirements of the investiga-
tions, and of Hosmer [Hosmer, 2002] who proposes
2005 Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS)
New Orleans, LA
DFRWS 2005 2
the use of digital time-stamps to prove the integrity
of digital evidence. Our model comprises a three-
stage process including the determination of input-
output layers, the assignment of read and write op-
erations, and the time-stamping of those operations
during the investigation.
In the next section, we detail the work of the au-
thors mentioned above and describe how their work
impacts on the goal of reproducibility in forensic in-
vestigation. In section 3, we describe our model of
the digital forensic process in detail, explaining how
it improves on past models concerning reproducibil-
ity. In section 4, we provide a forensic investigation
example, applying several models to it and compar-
ing the results in section 5. Finally, in section 6,
we summarize the paper and propose future work
which can be developed from it.
2 Reproducibility
To ensure a high quality of reproducibility, one has
to reproduce, first of all, the necessary experimental
conditions each time when a process needs to be re-
peated. In addition, during a case, a digital forensic
investigator may have to deal with different types of
digital devices and systems, and has many forensic
investigatory tools to choose from, which further in-
creases the complexity of the whole forensic setting.
A high degree of formalization both of the system
and of the process is therefore necessary to success-
ful reproduction of results. However, as Gerber and
Leeson [Gerber and Leeson, 2004] point out, digi-
tal investigation deals almost entirely with input-
output, while no existing model for input-output
formally proves the correctness of results to the
level required for forensic investigations. They go
on to state that “[f]orensic tools are, as a rule,
presently tested based solely on their predictabil-
ity: a full source code level audit of any tool, let
alone any operating system component, to ensure
precise and correct operation is basically impossi-
ble.”
The Hadley model, introduced by Gerber and
Leeson in [Gerber and Leeson, 2004], is an attempt
to analyze input and output in both the hardware
and software contexts in order to completely ex-
plain each data transformation of interest to the
investigation. Although their starting point is
the seven layer OSI model (physical, data link,
network, transport, session, presentation, applica-
tion), they argue that this choice of layers is not
prescriptive, but should be flexible, depending on
the investigation, and bound only by the following
objectives:
1. “A layer should be created where a different
level of abstraction is needed.
2. Each layer should represent a well-defined lo-
cation or abstraction.
3. Each layer should be chosen with an eye to-
ward representing well-recognized extant com-
ponents of peripheral I/O.
4. The layer boundaries should be chosen to keep
the information flow across interfaces between
layers well ordered.
5. The number of layers should be large
enough that distinct locations or abstrac-
tions need not be thrown together in the
same layer out of necessity, and small enough
that the model does not become unwieldy.”
[Gerber and Leeson, 2004]
In Figure 1 below, the hardware version of the
Hadley model is presented with input denoted as
a read operation and output as a write operation.
Gerber and Leeson assume that the system sends
no write commands whatsoever while in the foren-
sic investigation mode. (We return to this issue in
the description of our model.)
Peripheral Electronics
Write
Read
CPU
Memory
System Bus
I/O Bus
Peripheral Interface
Figure 1: the Hadley Hardware Model
The intentions of the Hadley model are to “give
computer forensic investigators access to a tool that
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completely explains each of its salient transforma-
tions of data; ... (to) give computer scientists a
complete, constructive, verifiable model of I/O; ...
(and to) define translations between hardware ...”
([Gerber and Leeson, 2004]) and software layers of
input-output. Only the first of these is relevant to
the goal of reproducibility.
With the move away from the standardized OSI
layers, Carrier [Carrier, 2003] argues for a com-
pletely open approach to the choice of layer and
uses the phrase ‘layer of abstraction’ to indicate a
generic layer chosen on the basis of several vari-
ables, including those of Gerber and Leeson listed
above. Others might depend on the skill of the in-
vestigator, the investigation requirements, the tools
available, and the system to be investigated.
Carrier’s approach [Carrier, 2003] does not focus
on the input-output (or read-write) operations, al-
though these still play a role in his concept, but
rather on the change in each layer as the data moves
in and out of it. He addresses the reproducibility
problem by introducing the idea of a margin of er-
ror on each layer which, according to him, can re-
sult either from tool implementation error or from
the simplification to abstraction layers. Like Ger-
ber and Leeson, Carrier also notes that ‘read-only’
mode is appropriate during an investigation.
Figure 2 below depicts Carrier’s layer structure
– the layer inputs consist of the input data and a
rule set, and the layer outputs consist of output
data and a margin of error.
Input Data
Rule Set
Output Data
Margin of Error
Abstraction
Layer
Figure 2: Single Abstraction Layer in Carrier’s
Model
As noted in the Hadley model (point 4 above),
it is important to preserve the correct order of
read and write operations in order to obtain re-
producibility of results in a computer system. For
instance, a read operation returns an invalid result
if it is executed before all the necessary information
is up-to-date; a data transaction is untraceable if a
write operation erases the content committed by
the previous write operation before any read op-
eration fetches the data. In a distributed system,
the correct order of occurrence of each operation
relies on accurate and precise time-synchronization
between all entities. Hosmer [Hosmer, 2002] recog-
nizes this as an issue for the forensic investigator
and suggests the use of secure and auditable digi-
tal time-stamps when handling digital evidence in
an investigation. He argues that such time-stamps
can supply accuracy, authentication, integrity, non-
repudiation and accountability. While his work fo-
cuses on the sources of secure and auditable time,
it does not examine the issues of where and on
what time-stamps should be placed. Moreover, it
is technically challenging to synchronize all clocks
in a distributed system; however, we assume in this
article that throughout an investigation, a trusted
and reliable server is available through which the
investigator is able to synchronize time.
In the next section, we introduce a framework
for digital investigations which combines the above
ideas into a more sophisticated model than seen
previously.
3 A New Model
We argue that any model of a system for the pur-
poses of forensic investigation should allow for re-
producibility of conditions, but should also take
into account the fact that the investigation may
need to be scaled up to a larger system over time.
The larger system may include devices not tested
or searched in the earlier one, and so the following
three properties of any model are crucial:
Generic. A model should cover all entities with
potential use for storing or transmitting
digital evidence, such as computers, cell
phones, PDAs, firewalls, image display sys-
tems, routers.
Scalable. A model should scale well in incorporat-
ing new forensic tools into the investigation;
existing tools should retain former behavior;
when a new piece of digital evidence is identi-
fied, updates should be easily accomplished.
Compatible. A model should be compatible with
all functions that the tools, system and net-
work offer. Options for handling digital evi-
dence should not be constrained by the model.
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Description of the Model
In our model, we make the following assumptions:
1. a system process can always contact a trusted
time server throughout the investigation,
2. the events of every operation of every process
are uniquely time-stamped,
3. read and write operations are transacted with-
out error of any kind,
4. every action performed by the investigator is
safely and faithfully recorded.
It is also assumed that a forensic investigator
begins an investigation with knowledge of the
relevant procedural guidelines. Requirements and
procedures may vary in different investigative
settings. In any event, it is generally acknowledged
that transient data are considered to be ‘read’ first
in order to achieve high reproducibility, and so
read operations are normally the starting point
of an investigation process. Furthermore, the
behavior of forensic tools in the system delineates
paths of ‘read’ and ‘write’ operations.
I. Choice of the abstraction layers
We set up appropriate layers of abstraction on the
basis of the following criteria, incorporating most
of the Gerber-Leeson points:
a) a layer should be created only when it is
needed,
b) each layer should represent a well-defined lo-
cation or function,
c) each layer should be chosen to represent exist-
ing components based on input-output,
d) the number of layers should be large enough
to separate essentially different locations and
functions, but small enough to be manageable.
Although we drop point 4 of the Gerber-Leeson
list, we describe a method of ordering information
flow relative to a forensic investigation in the fol-
lowing two sections.
Additionally, we concur with Carrier’s approach
to the choice of necessary abstraction layers
[Carrier, 2003]. Factors to take into consideration
include:
• the expertise of the investigator
• the tools available
• the structure of the digital systems being ana-
lyzed
• any special requirements of the investigation.
At the beginning of evaluating an investigation,
the points above are used in determining the
abstraction layers.
II. Assignment of read and write operations
Once a set of layers is constructed, we define two
operations ‘read’ and ‘write’. A ‘read’ operation is
performed when a digital sequence is accessed and
the content is extracted; a ‘write’ operation is per-
formed when a digital sequence is created, copied,
or modified. A ‘read’ operation is denoted picto-
rially as an arrow starting from the layer in which
the digital sequence resides and pointing towards
the layer to which the content of the sequence is
extracted. Similarly, each ‘write’ operation is rep-
resented as an arrow starting from the layer upon
which the digital sequence resides and pointing to
the layer on which the sequence is finally stored.
In order to obtain the highest reproducibility and
so as not to damage digital evidence, the investi-
gator should assign each operation based on the
knowledge of how the forensic tool functions in the
digital systems in which it is operating. Specifi-
cally, there are two points worth noticing:
• A ‘read’ operation is non-intrusive to any lay-
ers, but the information extracted will affect
any future ‘write’ operation relying on the con-
tent retrieved by this ‘read’ operation.
• A ‘write’ operation alters the content of digital
sequences in one or more layers. The content
written should always come from a trustwor-
thy and reliable source so that a back-track of
information is always possible. When a ‘write’
operation occurs, we must take account of all
the layers affected by it.
III. Time-stamping
Hosmer proposes in [Hosmer, 2002] to apply
globally-synchronized time-stamps in order to
maintain the integrity of digital evidence in a foren-
sic investigation. Applying this idea, we define a
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timing algorithm on ‘read’ and ‘write’ operations
which allows us to linearly order time throughout
the investigation as follows:
• Trusted time-stamps are obtained, recorded
and applied during the entire investigation so
that every forensic action is associated with an
accurate and precise time.
• A ‘read’ operation is time-stamped at the be-
ginning of a command to read information; a
‘write’ operation is time-stamped at the con-
clusion of the ‘write’ operation.
• If a time-stamped ‘read’ operation fails to
start due to data-synchronization with some
‘write’ operations, then we delay dispatching
this ‘read’ operation until the last ‘write’ fin-
ishes.
Applying the above algorithm, a sequence of
time-stamps is generated on ‘read’ or ‘write’ oper-
ations. In an investigative scenario consisting only
of ‘write’ operations, the reproducibility is compro-
mised if a piece of digital evidence is written mul-
tiple times; but when ‘read’ operations are also in-
volved in the scenario, time sequences assist in dis-
tinguishing the valid operations from invalid ones.
With respect to operations on each piece of digi-
tal evidence, there are four possible sequence pairs
to consider:
1. Read-After-Write (RAW) means a ‘write’ op-
eration finishes before we start to read the con-
tent. The content retrieved by the ‘read’ op-
eration is what the ‘write’ performed.
2. Read-After-Read (RAR) means two ‘read’ op-
erations retrieve information from the same
version of the source.
3. Write-After-Read (WAR) means a ‘write’ op-
eration changes the content what was read be-
fore.
4. Write-After-Write (WAW) means a ‘write’ op-
eration happens after a previous ‘write’ oper-
ation. So the content of the previous write is
erased.
Only two combinations have a negative impact
on the reproducibility. The reproducibility of a
WAR sequence is not maintained if the ‘write’ op-
eration in the sequence depends on the content re-
trieved by the ‘read’ operation. For a WAW se-
quence, the reproducibility is not maintained if a
‘write’ operation deletes the content committed by
a former ‘write’. The reproducibility of an inves-
tigative process is guaranteed if neither of these two
situations ever occurs. However, reproducibility is
still possible when allowing all four possibilities by
using time-stamps as described above.
Our model is designed to be generic, well scaled
and highly compatible with existing system func-
tions. Based on the ubiquitous existence of ab-
straction layers in digital data, forensic tools and
digital systems, our model gives the freedom to the
investigator to choose a suitable layered structure
to cover all digital entities in his/her investigative
case. The model achieves good scalability because
newly introduced elements in the model do not in-
cur any changes to operations performed by the
investigator on existing ones. Finally, our model is
compatible with all system functions as it is based
on input and output.
4 An Example
We suppose that Jo, a forensic investigator, has re-
ceived basic training on UNIX-like systems. Her
forensic toolkit includes several statically compiled
GNU programs: lsof, ps, ls, fdisk, dd, nc,
mkisofs and cdrecord. She may use any of these
programs to acquire digital evidence from a target
machine named pie. This host is running a GNU
Linux 2.6 system with a CD recorder and one IDE
hard drive. To simplify the situation, we assume
an ideal forensic environment.
The hard drive in the target system has two ext3
partitions: /dev/hda1 and /dev/hda2/, where the
disk usage shows:
Filesystem Used Available Use% Mounted
/dev/hda1 3810876 5314868 42% /
/dev/hda2 26041508 36914748 42% /home
Jo identifies some suspicious files in a folder
/home/tunna/.pic/hidden/ which is mounted to
/dev/hda2. In this example, her mission is limited
to acquire an image file from the evidence hard disk,
so she decides to use disk duplicate program dd.
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(7)
/dev/hda2
dd mkisofs
/dev/hda1
cdrecord
/tmp/image*.dd /tmp/image*.iso
Write
Read
dd
/home/image.dd
/dev/hda2
/dev/hda (IDE 0)
dd nc
Application Program
File System Layer
Media Management Layer
Physical Media Layer
Media Management Layer
Application Program
File System Layer
Network Layer
Application Program
File System Layer
Media Management Layer
Physical Media Layer
> (Redirection) /mnt/hdb1/hda.dd
/dev/hdb (IDE 1)
/dev/hdb1
| (Pipe)
bee:1234
/dev/scd0 (CD−RW)/dev/hda (IDE 0) 
Case 2: dd images /dev/hda2 on /dev/hda1 then on CD−RW
(1)
(2)
(2)
(2) (4) (5)(3)
(4)
(4)
Case 1: dd reads first 26 GB on /dev/hda2
(1)
(2)
(2)
Case 3: dd images /dev/hda and nc transfers the image file
(1)
(2) (3)
(4) (5)
(7)
(7)
(6)
(6)
Figure 3: Our Model Applied to the Cases
Case 1 Suppose she mistakenly thinks that the
evidence files are located in the first 26GB of
/dev/hda2. Then she attempts to image this part
of the partition and save the image file back to the
same partition. The available free space will enable
her to finish the following command.
pie #> dd if=/dev/hda2 of=/home/image.dd \
bs=1024 count=26041508
In this case, the execution of program dd involves
a disk partition as input and an image file as out-
put. Therefore, Jo sets up 3 layers accordingly: the
application program layer, the media management
layer and the file system layer. The investigation
does not require any other layers.
Then, she assigns a ‘read’ operation from
/dev/hda2 directly to dd and assigns a ‘write’ oper-
ation from dd to /home/image.dd and /dev/hda2.
As assumed in our model, all of Jo’s actions
should be faithfully recorded. According to the
documented history, the ‘read’ operation of dd
starts before the ‘write’ operation finishes. And
the program dd starts reading immediately after
the command line is typed in the console; thus two
‘write’ operations happen simultaneously. So Jo
retains the order of operations as they are docu-
mented, which makes the ‘read’ operation the first
and the ‘write’ the second (Figure 3).
Case 2 In this case, Jo realizes that the suspi-
cious files are possibly scattered in the entire parti-
tion (/dev/hda2). Then she might image the parti-
tion piece by piece and burn the split image files to
CDs. She uses some free disk space on the root par-
tition to cache CD images before they are recorded.
pie #> dd if=/dev/hda2 of=/tmp/image1.dd \
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bs=1024 count=700000; \
mkisofs -o /tmp/image1.iso \
/tmp/image1.dd; cdrecord -v speed=4 \
dev=0,0,0 -data /tmp/image1.iso
....
(ignore other 89 steps)
In this case, dd behaves in the same way as in
the first case; the input of program mkisofs are
partition image files (*.dd) and the output are
CD image files (*.iso); the program cdrecord has
CD image files as input and CD recorder device
/dev/scd0 as output. Hence, Jo adds the physical
media layer to describe disk devices in addition to
the previous three layers chosen. The investigation
does not need additional layers.
Then, she assigns a ‘read’ operation from
/dev/hda2 directly to dd and assigns a ‘write’ oper-
ation from dd to /tmp/image*.dd, /dev/hda1 and
/dev/hda. Program mkisofs ‘reads’ directly from
/tmp/image*.dd and ‘writes’ to /tmp/image*.iso,
/dev/hda1 and /dev/hda. And program cdrecord
‘reads’ from /tmp/image*.iso and ‘writes’ to
/dev/scd0.
As in the first case, every action should be associ-
ated with a unique time. Then Jo sorts them based
on the time values. Since every ‘read’ operation
starts immediately, she preserves the chronological
order of all the operations (Figure 3).
Case 3 If the suspect user tunna has tampered
with the system partition /dev/hda1, then the sec-
ond approach might destroy evidence of this. Jo
therefore decides to image the entire disk, and she
needs a place to store the disk image file. Suppose
a trusted Linux file server (bee) is running on the
same LAN with enough free storage space on its
second IDE hard disk (/dev/hdb1) formatted with
ext2 file system. Then Jo executes the following
commands on both machines respectively.
jo@bee $> nc -l -p 1234 > /mnt/hdb1/hda.dd
pie #> dd if=/dev/hda | nc bee 1234
In this case, the input of dd becomes the entire
disk and its output is redirected to the input of
program nc through a pipe ( | ). On the host pie,
nc takes piped data as input and generates network
packets as output; on the host bee, the input of
nc is network packets and the output is redirected
to a file. Thus, Jo introduces the network layer
in addition to the four layers of the second case.
These five layers are now sufficient to describe her
actions.
Jo assigns a ‘read’ operation from /dev/hda di-
rectly to dd and a ‘write’ operation from dd to
( | ). Program nc ‘reads’ firstly from bee:1234 and
‘writes’ to (>), and then to /mnt/hdb1/hda.dd,
/dev/hdb1 and /dev/hdb; the second nc ‘reads’
from ( | ) and ‘writes’ to bee:1234.
Time-stamps give the chronological order as nc
‘reads’ from bee:1234, dd ‘reads’ from /dev/hda,
nc ‘reads’ from ( | ), dd ‘writes’ to ( | ), nc ‘writes’
to bee:1234, nc ‘writes’ to (>), (>) ‘writes’ to
/dev/hdb.
In fact, the Linux kernel synchronizes ‘read’ and
‘write’ operations on the pipe, so Jo moves the
‘read’ of nc on ( | ) after the ‘write’ of dd. Simi-
larly, program nc blocks ‘read’ on port 1234 of host
bee. Therefore, Jo moves the ‘read’ operation of nc
appearing in the first command line on bee:1234
after the ‘write’ of the second nc, and gets the re-
ordered operations (Figure 3).
5 Analyzing the Example
The example of the previous section demonstrates
the acquisition of digital evidence from a Linux ma-
chine. In the first case, the ‘read’ operation on the
partition /dev/hda2 happens before the ‘write’ op-
eration which relies on the content from the ‘read’.
Hence, this indicates a WAR sequence on the evi-
dence partition and reproducibility cannot be guar-
anteed. In the second case, two ‘write’ operations
wipe out a large amount of unallocated disk space
which possibly contains the remnants of earlier
‘write’ operations committed by the suspect before
the investigation; so we find two WAW sequences
at the physical media layer and the media man-
agement layer in each command line. In the third
case, no WAR or WAW sequence is performed and
therefore, our investigator knows that commands
she executed do not affect the reproducibility of
the investigation process.
Neither the Carrier model nor the Hadley model
guarantees reproducibility in the above examples.
Carrier’s model lacks a mechanism to combine the
behavior of several programs as required in the last
two cases. The Hadley model permits consideration
of programs, digital sequences and read-write op-
erations within one system, but does not preserve
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the reproducibility of the investigation process.
6 Conclusions and Future
Work
We have introduced a new model of a forensic in-
vestigation which determines the layers on which
the investigation takes place, sets up a linear path
of ‘read’ and ‘write’ operations and arranges these
operations providing a linear time flow. The new
model provides a method of substantiating repro-
ducibility of the investigation. This new model is
generic, scalable and compatible with current com-
puter and digital device systems.
Forensic analysts, who have solid background
knowledge of forensic tools and underlying systems,
could quickly discover an erroneous forensic action
damaging the reproducibility by using our model.
In future work, we plan to develop this model to
include the possibility of error-capture.
The authors wish to thank the referees for useful
comments.
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